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TRIAGE: ENDGAME REALITIES
George P. Smith, II*
.... Until recently doctors were committed to trying to save
all their patients. But now, with the advent of such expensive and
complicated procedures as open heart surgery, transplants, and ar-
tificial organs, hospitals had to pick and choose to whom to give
these life saving operations. For the time being, these techniques
were limited by extraordinary costs and by the space available in
the sophisticated units needed for aftercare. In general, the teach-
ing staff tended to favor patients with multi systemic disease, who
did not always do well, while private physicians such as Thomas
leaned toward otherwise healthy, productive members of
society ....
... . It was as if no one understood that surgery, that life-giv-
ing process, as well as the costly intensive care unit, were intended
for patients who would recover, not the living dead ....
d o . . 'Look,' shouted [Dr.] Thomas [Kingsley], 'all I want to
do is surgery on people who deserve to live, not a bunch of mental
defectives or people who are going to die of other illnesses.
Medicine has to understand that our resources are limited. We
can't let worthy candidates wait while people with multiple sclero-
sis or gays with autoimumunal deficiencies take valuable beds and
OR time.'
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The classical definition of triage may be acknowledged as being:
The medical screening of patients to determine their priority for
treatment; the separation of a large number of casualties, in mili-
tary or civilian disaster medical care, into three groups: those who
cannot be expected to survive even with treatment, those who will
recover without treatment, and the priority group of those who
need treatment in order to survive.2
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, B.S., J.D., Indiana University;
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1. R. COOK, GODPLAYER 75, 118, 360 (1983).
2. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 4th unabridged lawyer's ed. at 1476 (W. COR-
SETrE, ed. 1976). See also, R.'VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHicS 259-71, 202 (1981).
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Even before "triage" found significant application to military or civilian ca-
tastrophes, its root meaning in French-"sorting, picking, grading or select-
ing according to quality"-was subsequently first applied in the English
language to the process of separating wool according to quality and even
later, to the separation of coffee beans into three categories: "best quality,"
"middling" and "triage coffee", with the last consisting of beans which had
been broken and were, thus, the lowest in grade.3 Over the course of time,
the use of triage has been expanded to other situations where it has become,
in actuality, a metaphor for social, economic and even political decisions.4
Both the idea and the process of sorting casualties of war were developed
by Napoleon's chief medical officer, Baron Dominique Larrey.5 One of the
baron's early goals in his efforts to organize an efficient system of medical
services to the injured was to perform surgeries as soon as possible after
soldiers sustained their injuries. To this end, he developed "ambulances"
whose purpose was not only to transport the wounded from the battle area
but also serve as mobile units for providing instantaneous medical assist-
ance.6 Additionally, he put into operation a scheme for sorting casualties on
the basis of their medical need. Accordingly, "Those who are dangerously
wounded must be tended first, entirely without regard to rank or distinction.
Those less severely injured must wait until the gravely wounded have been
operated on and dressed." 7 Medical personnel, then, were concerned cen-
trally with finding ways to conserve scarce resources-with the first and
foremost being their time and their energy. 8
Although during the Civil War the United States did not essentially class-
ify wounded soldiers for purposes of medical treatment, but rather provided
such care without regard to physical condition, during World War I, it did
in fact adopt from the French and the British, the principle of triage.9 And,
to this day, the current military policy of the armed forces of the United
States is recognized as a policy of triage which involves both the evaluation
and the classification of casualties for not only purposes of treatment but of
evacuation which is tied to the principle "accomplishing the greatest good
for the greatest number of wounded and injured men."' 0 Thus, it is-then-
that an explicit utilitarian rationale is embraced and extolled.
3. Childress, Triage in Neonatal Intensive Care: The Limitations of a Metaphore, 69 VA.
L. REv. 547, 549 (1983).
4. D. RUND & T. RAUSCH, TRIAGE 3-10 (1981).
5. G. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE 1 (1982).
6. Id at 2.
7. Id
8. Id at 5.
9. Supra note 3, at 550.
10. Id
Triage: Endgame Realities
A DISTRIBUTIONAL STANDARD
Distributing scarce medical resources involves obvious problems of dis-
tributive justice. Although acknowledged as existing, they are quite difficult
to resolve in a pragmetic manner. Consequently, owing to this often insur-
mountable difficulty, the question of how the distribution will be made is
reduced to the issue of who will make the first order decision.'" Yet, unless
triage decisions are to be but recognized as but arbitrary and capricious,
some criteria must be in place for scrutiny and examination. The Hemodial-
ysis Program of Seattle Washington's Artifical Kidney Center studied
eighty-seven such centers around the country in order to develop a set of
criteria for allowing patients to be admitted to their programs. 2 The dialy-
sis candidate profile that emerged found the following criteria to be used
always in the selection and admissions process: medical suitability (good
prognosis with dialysis); absence of other disabling disease; intelligence (as
related to understanding treatment); likelihood of vocational rehabilitation;
age; primacy of application for available vacancy in the hemodialysis pro-
gram; and a positive psychiatric evaluation (re acceptance of disease and
goals of the actual treatment).' 3 The following conditions were judged as
excluding selection of a patient for participation in the program: mental
deficiency; poor family environment; criminal record; indigency; poor em-
ployment record; lack of transportation and lack of state residency.
14
Fault may be found with one or more of these factors used in selection.
But, absent a unifying philosophy of medicine which defines with precision
its goals for achievement, acknowledges whether such achievement is possi-
ble, and determines whether it reflects a desirable goal of contemporary
human culture"5 and develops rational guidelines for making necessary criti-
cal choices,' 6 medicine will not be successful.' 7 Medicine has existed in the
twentieth century without a vital philosophy is due to the simple fact that its
11. Kass, The New Biology: What Price Relieving Man's Estate? Sci. 782 (Nov. 19, 1971).
12. R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE To FAIL, chs. 7, 8 (1974).
13. Id
14. Id.
Additional factors of consideration in utilitarian decision making in broad issues of triage
may be listed as: the past services rendered of a candidate; potential future contributions; life
expectancy; role in the family; prospect for success of the use of the scarce medical resource in
question; and the progress of science factor. Rescher, The Allocation of Exotic Medical Life-
saving Therapy in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE at 526, 529 (S. Gorowitz, et. al. eds.
1976).
15. Rescher, supra note 14, at 523.
16. E. PELLEGRINO & D. THOMASMA, A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRAC-
TICE, viii (1981).
17. Id
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successes "in curing" has been of enormous and overpowering. 8 Indeed,
"this success is due to knowledge and technique based on experience, not
theories and philosophical speculation."' 9 '
Today, there is a recognition that an admirable goal of a national health
policy is quality health care at an affordable cost.2" Cost containment thus
has become a major force of wide significance and application in all levels of
health care decision making.21 There is little disputation of the fact that
resources are scarce relative to wants and that they have alternative uses;
and furthermore that differences in individual wants mean an assignment of
different values to these wants.22 The basic dilemma, then, is where to deter-
mine a line of compromise between competing interest groups.
23
PRINCIPLES OF ALLOCATION: UTILITARIAN V. EGALITARIAN
Since the law provides at present no uniformly agreed upon principles
which may be applied in order to regulate the allocation of scarce medical
resources, current medical practice draws upon a structure for decision mak-
ing evolved as such from a number of philosophical and ethical constructs.'
There are five utilitarian principles of application which are operative in the
hierarchy of triage: the principles of medical success; immediate usefulness;
conservation; parental role and general social value.25 Translated as such
into decisional operatives, what emerges is a recognition that priority of se-
lection for use of a scarce medical resource should be accorded to those for
whom treatment has the highest probability of medical success, would be
most useful under the immediate circumstances, to those candidates for use
who require proportionally smaller amounts of the particular resource, those
having the largest responsibilities to dependents or those believed to have the
greatest actual or potential general social worth.26 The utilitarian goal is-
simply stated-to achieve the highest possible amount of some good or re-
source.27 Thus, utilitarian principles are also commonly referred to as
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id. at 267.
21. Id at ch. 12.
22. Supra note 19.
23. Id at 268.
24. Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 620 (1969). See VEATCH, supra
note 2, at 259-71; Spicker & Raye, The Beating of Prognosis on The Ethics of Medicine: Con-
genital Anomalies, the Social Context and The Law in THE LAW-MEDICINE RELATION: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION at 189, 195-203 (S. Spiker, J. Healer, Jr. eds. 1981).
25. Supra note 5, at 106.
26. Id at 63-86.
27. Id at 87.
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"good maximizing strategies."'28
Egalitarian alternatives--contrariwise-seek either a basic maintenance
or a restoration of equality for persons in need of a particular scarce re-
source.29 There are five basic principles utilized here: 1.) the principle of
saving no one-thus priority is given no one because, simply, none should be
saved if not all can be saved; 2.) the principle of medical neediness under
which priority is accorded to those determined to be the medically neediest;
3.) the principle of general neediness which allows priority to be given to the
most helpless or generally neediest; 4.) the principle of queuing where prior-
ity is given to those individuals who arrive first and-lastly- 5.) the princi-
ples of random selection where priority of selection is given to those selected
by pure chance.3°
To the utilitarian, maximizing utility, and hence what is diffusely referred
to as the "general welfare," are both the primary Ground and Subject of all
judgments.3 That which is required in order to maximize utility overall
may, thus, infringe upon an individual's own entitlements or rights to partic-
ular goods. 32 Accordingly, moral rights are either rejected generally or rec-
ognized as certainly not absolute.33
Philosophy and religion may well provide us all with the necessary bal-
ance and direction for life and allow us to develop an ethic for daily living
and a faith as to the future, but in cases of neonatology where law, science,
medicine and religion interact great care must be exercised in order to pre-
vent inexplicable fears and emotions-oftentimes fanned by journalistic
prophets of the "what if" shock culture-taking hold of and thereby block-
ing powers of rationality and humanness.34 The basic challenge of modem
medicine should be, simply, to seek, promote and maintain a level of real--
and when the case may indicate, potential-achievement for its user-patients
which allows for full and purposeful living.35 Indeed, man himself should
seek to pursue decision-making responsibilities and exercise autonomy in a
rational manner and guided by a spirit of humanism. He'should seek-fur-
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id
31. Gewrith, Can Utilitarianism Justify Any Moral Rights? in ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 167 (J. Pennak & J. Chapman eds. 1982).
32. Id at 167-68.
33. Id. at 168.
Bentham, in effect, rejected moral rights generally. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights in Ox-
FORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, at 171-201 (A. Simpson 2d ed. 1973).
34. See generally, Smith, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and The New Biology,
3 PACE L. REV. 63 (1982); Smith, Uncertainties on The Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and The
New Biology, 41 THE PHAROS 10 (1978).
35. G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 2, 8 (1981).
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ther-to minimize human suffering and maximize the social good. Defining
the extent and application of the social good will vary with the situation of
each case, obviously. 36
RULES OF EXCLUSION AND FINAL SELECTION
Perhaps utilization of a Rule of Exclusion might go far to eliminate what
may be viewed as the harshness of triage. Under such a rule, some individu-
als would be simply eliminated from "competition" for the particular scarce
modality of treatment or care facilities even if the resource(s) were in unlim-
ited supply.37 Thus, applying this rule, the scarcity of the resource(s) in
question would never even be considered.3"
Rules of Exclusion are preferable-in certain definite ways-to Rules of
Final Selection when implementing the principles of triage. With Rules of
Exclusion it is generally unnecessary to make comparisons between specific
individuals; for either the patient meets the minimum medical criteria or he
does not. When operable, these rules have the appearance of greater objec-
tivity and less arbitrariness than a Final Selection Rule that states simply:
"First come, first served."39 If the standard of exclusion is structured in
such a manner and at a level high enough to achieve the purpose of initially
reducing the applicant group to that specific treatment number, the very
selection process will turn on the decision of exclusion and obviate the need
to even be forced to apply additional rules of ultimate or final selection. 40
There are, essentially, two approaches to structuring and applying Rules
of Final Selection: utilize a comparative analysis of the social utility of cur-
ing various patients in a selection pool or undertake no comparison but
rather apply an arbitrary-yet egalitarian-formula, normally first come,
first served (regardless of whether the first served might be a socially irre-
sponsible derelict).4
As observed, medical providers failed-themselves-in the past to articu-
late precise rules to guide them in determining patient social utility vis-d-vis
use of a scarce resource or for that matter to structure a list of exceptions to
the first come rule of final selection. These rules of final selection based-it
is seen--on value judgments and value judgments alone, are not arguably
within a special area of competence for a physician to make. Contrariwise,
36. Id See D. CRANE, THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS TREATMENT OF
CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS (1978).
37. Supra note 27, at 654.
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id
41. Id at 657.
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rules of exclusion are based on and, indeed, formulated from professional
evaluations and considerations and are regarded as less subjective and arbi-
trary and more acceptable to both patients and doctors alike than the rules
of final selection.42
No principle of preference is clearly correct, humane or totally just. Other
suggestions include selection of a patient user by chance or randomization
and queing 4a, the establishment of separate waiting lists for patients in differ-
ent age groups and for those with or without families" and-perhaps most
ideally-widespread support and development of a program calling for the
total utilization of artificial organs which would alleviate the scarcity of nat-
ural organs.45 To one degree or other, all of these suggestions are attractive.
Obviously no definite solutions can be submitted here. If, however, health
care providers seek to pursue their decision making responsibilities in a ra-
tional manner and guided by a spirit of humanism which minimizes human
suffering and maximizes the social good of each situation, a humane stan-
dard of justice will be achieved and triage will operate as a complement to its
attainment.
LOVE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKING
From a Judeo-Christian theological perspective, the meaning, the sub-
stance, and-indeed-the consummation of life is tied to inextricable expres-
sions of Love: love of God and love of neighbor. It is through the love of
others that God is recognized and loved.46 The meaning of life under this
interpretation, then, is to be found in human relationship and the qualities of
respect, concern, compassion, and justice that support such relationships.47
Social justice demands that each individual be given an opportunity to
maximize his individual potential. Yet, a point is often reached where main-
tenance of an individual is in defiance of all concepts of basic humanitarian-
ism and social justice. When an individual's condition is such that it
represents a negation of any "truly human" qualities or "relational-poten-
42. Id. at 656, 665, 666.
43. Supra note 3, at 557-59. See generally THE ETHICS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN
HEALTH CARE (K. Boyd ed. 1979).
44. Supra note 27, at 665.
45. Freud, Organ Tansplant" Ethical and Legal Problems in MORAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE at 44 (S. Gorowitz, et.al. 1976).
46. MCCORMICK, To Save or Let Die and The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, in How
BRAVE A NEW WORLD 339, at 346 (R. McCormick ed. 1981).
47. Id.
See Morrison, Implications of Prenatal Diagnosis for the Quality of and Right to Human
Life, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 329 (. Humber & R. Almeder eds. 1976). See
generally, Marcin, Justice and Love, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 363 (1984).
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tial,"48 then the best form of treatment should be arguably no treatment at
all.
Life should not be viewed as an end in and of itself, but rather as some-
thing that should be preserved so that other values can be fulfilled. Life
should be preserved when it holds a potentiality for human relationships.
Although this standard does not admit of mathematical precision and must
be applied with great humility and caution, it is nonetheless a beginning
from which particular medical formulations may be developed.49
The concepts of ordinary versus extraordinary life-sustaining processes
are highly relative, not only in time and locale, but also in their application
to individual cases.5 0 These concepts in essence serve as value judgments
which determine whether a given modality of treatment poses an undue
hardship on the patient or provides hope for a direct benefit.51 If a particu-
lar mode of medical or surgical intervention either imposes too great a hard-
ship on the patient, or could offer no reasonable hope of benefit, the
treatment could be correctly viewed as extraordinary and, thus, non-
obligatory. 52
Concern must be expressed regarding the patient's comfort in the remain-
ing days of his life, if such an extraordinary act is undertaken or withheld.
This determination of whether the contemplated treatment is ordinary or
extraordinary is essentially a quality of life statement.5 3 In coming to this
statement, we knowingly or unknowingly use a substituted judgment to con-
clude that, if we were in a similar situation, we would (or would not, as the
case may be) wish to survive in such a state of impairment. Decisions of this
nature are made within a vortex of deep emotionalism. They can be aided-
but certainly never validated totally-by using or accepting the doctrine of
triage as a construct for decision making.
Since the binding force of life is love, it can be argued that man should
endeavor to maximize a response to love in whatever life situations he finds
himself.5 4 If an act renders more harm than good to the individual in-crisis,
and to those around him, the act would properly be viewed as unloving. The
crucial point of understanding is that a basic cost/benefit analysis is almost
48. Supra note 46, at 349.
49. See generally Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63
NEB. L. REv. 707 (1984).
50. R. MCCORMICK, NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY, 1965 THROUGH 1980, at 565
(10981).
51. Id
52. Id
53. Id. See supra note 49.
54. See Fletcher, Love is The Only Measure, 83 COMMONWEALTH 427 (1966).
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always undertaken--consciously or unconsciously." Of course, the meth-
odology utilized in this assessment will be situational and incapable of abso-
lute determination.56 Yet of necessity, the basic norm to be used will be that
of love.
55. I. KENNEDY, THE UNMASKING OF MEDICINE 145 (1980).
But see, O'Boyle, On Attitudes Toward Death and The Cost of Dying, 49 LINACRE Q. 48, 54,
passium (Feb. 1982).
56. See MCCORMICK, supra note 49, at 77.
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